The drift of public spending towards the elderly: A generational analysis of the trend of public policies in Spain by Guillem López & Ana Mosterin
  1
 
THE DRIFT OF PUBLIC SPENDING TOWARDS THE 
ELDERLY: 






The tendency for public welfare spending to be increasingly aimed at the elderly 
has been pointed out for the US and other developed countries. While population 
ageing is a common trend, it is not obvious why the shift in spending exceeds the 
trend in ageing, or why per capita spending on the elderly increases.  
 
We show that this is the case in Spain, identify the losers from this development, 
discuss the policies that underlie this trend, and propose adjustments based on 
Musgrave’s fixed proportions rule as an inter-generationally fair distribution.  
 
Key words:  Intergenerational equity, Musgrave’s rule, Spanish social policy and 
ageing. 
 




Pati et al. (op. cit.) and Newachek et al. (op. cit) discussed the relative changes in 
social expenditure by age during occurred in USA during the period 1980 – 2000. 
They focused primarily on the shift of public expense on welfare for the elderly 
versus children, those being the two age groups that are net recipients of public 
funds.  Their consensus is that under limited budgets, the observed public   2
spending for older people is expected to threaten public commitments to other 
deserving groups, in particular children.  
 
The acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty and the Agreement for Stability and 
Convergence, which restrain further rises in public expenditure in an ageing 




Our analysis of the trend in Spain over a similar time frame (ca. 1980 – 2000) 
replicates this result. However, we have focused on general indicators of welfare 
and provision over time for all age groups, including those who are net 
contributors to the public system. Our results show that the older age group 
certainly has gained the most over this period of time, and has claimed a 
proportion of resources that has increased beyond what can be explained by 
population ageing alone. The losers seem to be individuals in diverse conditions of 
fragility across the population, and overall the age group that has lost out the most 
on average is the youngest working generation.  
 
AGEING AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE IN SPAIN 
 
Like many developed countries, Spain is experiencing strong population ageing 
and an increasing ratio of retired to working population. One might think that 
benefits to the elderly or retired might be diluted to a lesser or greater extent as 
their number increases. Surprisingly though, resources are eroded from other age 
groups to increase resources geared towards the elderly even on a per capita basis. 
The older working and retired cohorts claim the bulk of gains from productivity 
growth over the last decades, while young workers have barely improved their 
relative income.  
                                                 
1 (Figures 6 and 8 in the Appendix offer some illustration of the problem at 
present in the European Union. For the sustainability of the Welfare States under 
the new demographic Challenges in general see  Lindbeck A. -CSIFO, 2006  and 
Dang, T-H et. al 2006 (op. cit).   3
 
In the following section we analyze the evolution of welfare for various age 
groups along various parameters for which data is available: poverty risk, income, 
housing, unemployment and healthcare. 
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In the discussion we seek to avoid repeating some of the inconclusive and 
contentious interpretations of generational equity issues debated in the US in the 
1980s and 90s. Instead we invoke Musgrave’s Fixed Proportions rule as a working 
definition of inter-generational fairness, and compare Spanish social policy and 




Poverty risk: One summary measure of welfare experienced by a cohort might be 
its specific poverty risk.  Poverty risk in this context is defined as the probability 
of income falling below 60% of the average overall personal income. We have 
analyzed poverty risk for all age groups over two decades to see what the relative 
changes over time have been.  
 
Poverty risk diminishes over 
the given timeframe for 
individuals below 44 years of 
age, as well as for those above 
70. In addition, by 2001, 
starting at retiring age the 
poverty risk not only doesn’t 
increase but decreases steadily 
with age so that the oldest age 
                                                 
2 Since we do not have sufficient reliable data, we cannot frame our analysis 
following the intergenerational debt approach ‘a la Kothlikoff’, but recently Patxot 
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groups suffer the smallest poverty risk of all age groups, in striking contrast to the 
1981 scenario. 
 
Curiously the age band between 50 and 65 years, the group that has experienced 
the strongest income rise (see below), has seen their poverty risk increase over the 
time frame. This is most certainly due to rigidities in the labor market, which force 
an unusual amount of income variance onto this age group. Those individuals of 
this age who have been in continuous employment typically receive high salaries 
and enjoy labor privileges that accumulate over many years. The long-term 
unemployed in this age group don’t find a way back into the labor market and are 
doomed until old age pensions end up “saving” them. Until that age the data 
displays great variance. 
 
This reduction in poverty risk from pre- to post-retirement age is also due to the 
fact that anti-poverty transfers are channeled through the social security or public 
pension scheme, which in this case makes non-contributive payments to retirement 
age poor only, rather than through a general minimum income scheme that would 
redistribute within all age groups. The confusion of social security’s role as a 
contributive as well as redistributive scheme leads to this pro-old bias. 
 
Income variance is smaller among the young, as labor market reform has 
concentrated on new entrants and young workers. So the risk of labor market 
exclusion is lower for the young, although their salaries are lower. 
 
 
Income: Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
income by age group for 1981 and 2001. One 
fundamental difference shown is the way 
income formerly declined from the onset of 
retirement in 1981 whereas in 2001 it stays 







20 40 60 80 100
edad
ing81 ing01  5
perhaps most noticeably, there is a stark increase in income for the group around 
50 years of age. 
 
In contrast there is relatively minor improvement in income for those in their 20s 
and 30s. In fact, as the figure below shows, the meagre improvement in income is 
primarily due to an increase in the employment rate for that age group. So 
collectively this age group has higher relative income, but only in exchange for 
more hours of work.  
 
In fact, looking only at the employed, 
there is an age range in the mid-30s, in 
which young workers earn less for their 
work in real terms in 2001 than in 
1981, and it is only the population 
above 35 that benefits from the 
increase in productivity almost as an 
increasing function of age. 
 
 
Housing: An incidental phenomenon that is unrelated to public policy, but that 
compounds the relative welfare advantage of older vs. younger adults is the 
Spanish real estate boom that made property prices skyrocket lasting recent years. 
Mortgage payments reduce the net labor income of young owners by over 30% in 
many Spanish regions, while the 
older generation paid off their 
property in the decades before the 
boom.  
 
Home ownership in Spain is high, 
encouraged by fiscal incentives 
and is traditionally coveted. The 
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own, is sufficiently entrenched that it is revealing to explore who doesn’t own 
their home but rents. Unfortunately there is a gap in the “continuous survey” and a 
redefinition of tenancy categories in 1997, which leads to a discontinuity in the 
relative evolutions. In any case, it is evident that rental tenancy of the younger age 
group increases as that of the older age group decreases. 
 
Emancipation: Another indication in the housing data of the straits faced by 
young adults is the reversion of the trend for early emancipation. In 2001 fewer 
young adults below 30 had left the parental home than in 1981. In 1981 37% of 25 
year olds lived in their parents’ home. By 2001 this proportion had increased to 
53%. Fewer young adults are living alone or with a partner, and more are sharing a 
home with other relatives, friends and roommates. It is difficult to explain the 
delayed move from the parental home as an unrestricted preference. Instead, this 
phenomenon is symptomatic of the economic conditions of the current young 
cohorts. 
 
Health Care Expenditure: Spanish public health care expenditure is principally 
composed of hospital and specialist services (54%), pharmaceuticals (21%), and 
primary health care services (15%)
3.We analyzed the evolution of hospital 
expenditure by age group between 1987 and 2002 using the Encuesta de 
Morbilidad Hospitalaria of the National Statistical Institute. For each age we 
computed the number of hospital stays, the average length of stay in days, and the 
sum of days spent. 1981 the number of hospital stays peaks for the twenties and 
early thirties due to child delivery stays. In 2002 however, the visits by the elderly 
exceed those of delivery stays. 
 
We calculated the number of days spent in hospital as a proxy for health 
expenditure. The length of hospital stay has been reduced drastically between 
1978 and 2002. The relative decrease is more pronounced for older age groups. 
Nonetheless, the strong increment in hospital visits by the elderly dominates this 
                                                 
3 Cuentas Satélite del Gasto Sanitario Público 1998. Ministerio de Sanidad y 
Consumo   7
decrease. Hospital service measured in days of stay was fairly evenly distributed 
across adult age groups in 1978, while in contrast hospital use increases with age 
in 2002 such that the majority of service days are consumed by those above 60. In 
1978 the number of hospital days consumed by people 60 and over is about half 
the number consumed by those below 60. By 2002, it is 123%. 
 
The scarce tradition of palliative care and the limited prevalence of a good death 
culture contrary to run-away end of life therapeutic expenditure, cause medical 
expenditure to be highly concentrated towards the end of an individual’s life cycle. 
 
Unemployment Expenditure: Unemployment benefits have also shifted towards 
the later active years. In 1981 the number of unemployed young (16 – 30 years) is 
5 time greater than the number of unemployed old (50 – 64 years). In 2003 it 
merely doubles it. The beneficiaries of public expenditure have changed in greater 
proportion than suggested by the raw unemployment figures as the young 
unemployed are often looking for their first job and therefore don’t qualify for 
benefits. 
 
Returns to Public Pension Payments: We also calculated the returns on social 
security or retirement payments for various cohorts by compounding all social 
security income deductions during standard working life and calculating or 
estimating the sum of pension payments in old age. We compared a few cohorts 
born around 1940 to a few cohorts born around 1970. The implicit returns that 
would result if these payments were obtained by capitation falls by 40%-50% for 
the younger cohorts from 1940 compared to the cohorts that recently retired in the 
1990s. 
 
In a separate analysis we found that between 1980 and 2005 the ratio of average 
pension to average salary has increased from 38% to 43%. 
4 
                                                 
4 Data source: for average salaries until 2000: INE, Encuesta de Salarios en la 





We have analyzed wealth and welfare by age group over time along various major 
parameters for which there is available data.  The distribution of wealth and 
welfare and social expenditure by age groups has significantly changed. 
 
This effect is not by itself cause for concern. It may simply be the case that 
increased life expectation and improved health, along with other social and 
lifestyle developments of recent decades, has brought on a new valuation of well-
being along the life cycle, and that the collective time discount factor has relaxed 
to allow for an extended period of reward at the end of a relatively more frugal 
working life (relative here refers simply to the proportions of resources allotted to 
the two life phases relative to one another). What would be wrong with that? After 
all, significant social change in the past decades such as changes in education and 
leisure, marriage patterns and family composition has coincided with biological 
changes such as height, life span, onset of menstruation etc. If developed 
democratic countries with fairly liberal social and financial systems 
simultaneously display this trend of welfare concentration towards old age, 
perhaps economists should just stand by and take note of collective revealed 
preference.  
 
It is however worth exploring what the underlying reasons and consequences of 
such a development are, and to identify criteria of longitudinal distribution and 
efficiency that may shape overall inter-generational welfare in the same way that 
distributional and efficiency issues shape population welfare at any fixed point in 
time. By no means should this exercise detract from the need to improve welfare 
distribution within any age group, nor does it imply a denial of current “cross-
sectional” welfare issues. 
                                                                                                                           
Laboral (ETCL), salarios para obreros, ambas jornadas, todos los sectores. For 
average pensions: INSS, Memorias 2007, p. 277.   9
 
Throughout our research we have observed well-documented flaws in current 
distributional welfare policies in the form of pockets of social fragility across all 
age groups, in particular among single parents, immigrants and widows. There is 
in other words intra-generational inequality and excessive variance in welfare. 
Several demographic parameters point to collectives warranting separate study. 
 
The most dramatic negative effect of the observed shift in social spending patterns 
is however of an inter-generational nature. This is not to be understood in terms of 
“young versus old” at this or any particular point in time. Rather, generational 
equity is to be understood dynamically through time; there aren’t two kinds of 
people but rather different ages in each individual’s life cycle. Just as there are 
valid principles to maximize an individual’s lifetime utility, such as consumption 
smoothing, or to enhance social welfare, such as a particular balance of equality 
and efficiency, there should be a practical way to measure the welfare effects of 
the pattern of inter-generational fluctuations. 
 
One dynamic model of inter-generational fairness is Musgrave’s Fixed 
Proportions Rule recently re-discovered by Esping-Andersen and Myles. This 
model makes no normative prescription whatsoever about how welfare should be 
distributed through life cycle. Instead it provides a formula to insure inter-
generational fairness or constancy. It proposes to define a desirable lifetime 
distribution of income or welfare consumption and stick to it over time. Whether 
retirement is to be relatively short and frugal or extended and relatively costly in 
proportion to earlier stages of life, the adopted proportion ought to be kept over 
time and generations. Obviously the proportion cannot be exactly fixed because 
available funds fluctuate with demographic trends and productivity shocks. 
Musgrave’s fixed proportions rule foresees these fluctuations and advocates 
splitting any surplus or deficit homogeneously among all age groups at every 
instance.  
   10
Our objection to the social policy sustaining the observed trends in Spain is based 
on Musgrave’s principle. The problem is that policy doesn’t naturally and flexibly 
adjust to circumstance, but often lags behind, particularly in cases of straits that 
require distributing a shortfall or per capita decline.  The delay in the introduction 
of pension reforms is a universal example of this. A passive stance by politicians 
who allow a deficit to accumulate whose eventual effects are severe but diffuse 
faces less focused resistance than any reform with a defined target and date.  
 
One pattern of reform adopted in Spain is the gradual phasing-out of an outdated 
entrenched status quo. For example, successive labor reforms change and 
liberalize employment rules for new entrants to the labor market who have never 
known any better, while older workers get to keep their privileges, protections and 
inefficient benefits intact. While it is useful reform, and eventually will apply to 
all, for some decades this pattern causes a flux of productivity gains from the 
younger to the older workers. On average, when an office worker retires she is 
replaced by a younger worker at half her salary.  
 
Somewhere through the working population runs the fuzzy line that separates 
workers with different length histories in the work force and different conditions, 
and this line moves forward year by year, increasing the proportion of reformed 
jobs.  
 
The pay-as-you-go pension scheme meanwhile grows unsustainable due to the 
gradual inversion of the population pyramid. Yet retirement benefits were defined 
and promised to today’s pensioners decades ago, and so their claims are literally 
grandfathered in. (Due to reduced cohorts from the Spanish Civil War, Social 
Security is actually experiencing a small transient surplus that is bound to grow 
into a substantial deficit over the next two decades). Again there will be a fuzzy 
line that separates the rigidly protected cohorts from subsequent cohorts who will 
at some point, somehow, and to some extent have to accept a reduction of the 
“deserved” pension after the standard contributions of a working life. 
   11
As it happens, it is likely that one generation (the baby boom generation) will be 
hit at several stages of its life cycle by various related and unrelated shocks that 
fail to compensate for one another. These may compound to impose an undue 
share of the demographic burden, whilst depriving it of an inter-generationally fair 
share of productivity gains.  So the prolonged financial dependency in youth due 
to entrant specific labor market reform and real estate developments, the increased 
work load and the compromises in family planning that we observe today, can’t be 
expected to be compensated for by a golden retirement. By the time this 
generation reaches retirement age those privileges will be curtailed as well. 
Overall, this generation is not experiencing a reallocation of welfare during their 
life cycle, but an overall loss with respect to what is fair by Musgrave’s rule.  
 
This total effect is not intentional in any political instance, and yet it arises. We 
identify three possible reasons for the observed shift, 1) vertically separated 
budget administration, 2) political power and voter composition, and 3) cash vs. 
kind defined benefits. 
 
The first reason is the fragmentation of social fund allocation by administrative 
authority. Newachek et al. attribute changes in the proportion of US public 
expenditure on children vs. the elderly to a shift of competence from the central 
government to the states in the provision of services to children. They speculate 
that this has weakened children’s welfare compared to that of pensioners, whose 
administration remains in the hands of government. Similarly pensions and, (up 
until 2002) health services are centrally administered in Spain, while most other 
welfare services are provided sub-centrally on a weaker basis of transferred funds.   
 
A distribution of the social budget into ministries and administrations allows a 
similar trend in Spain. For example, a policy discussion on the desirability of an 
exemption from co-payment on drugs for pensioners is conducted without taking 
into account the level or trend of pension payments. It is considered pertinent to 
the Health authority and unrelated to the Pensions system. Reallocations of funds 
therefore occur between cohorts and within an area of authority rather than cross-  12
sectionally or intra-generationally. This type of encapsulation promotes inter-
generational fluctuations by the mere possibility that such inter-generational 
redistributions will compound rather than compensate. Budgets are balanced 
within policy areas, but no checksums are computed on the mixed basket of 
services and benefits enjoyed by the cohorts at different stages of their life cycle. 
 
Other reasons for life cycle shifts in public expense distribution are voter 
composition, and cash vs. kind definition of benefits. Benefits to the elderly tend 
to be acquired cash defined individual rights, whereas more general welfare 
benefits are discretionary given the means available at any point in time and 
therefore susceptible to reduction and dilution.  
 
From an efficiency standpoint, there is a clear advantage to investment in children 
and education. There are however developments that tilt political power away 
from them. The age of the median voter in Spain is expected to rise drastically 
from 44 years in 2000 to 57 years by 2050, moving from the youngest among 
median voters in the group comprised by Germany, France, UK, Italy and the US 
to the oldest in the group.
5 At the same time the birth rate has come to an extreme 
low, which has recovered slightly  (1.3 children per woman) thanks to the higher 
birth rates of young recent immigrants. 17% of children born in 2005 had at least 
one foreign parent. Children don’t have a vote, and while children of most 
immigrant parents have universal access to education and health care, they are 
represented by fewer adults who can vote on their behalf or with their interests in 
mind. Immigration has reduced the number of young parents votes relative to 
votes of older cohorts not actively engaged in child rearing.  
 
The public pension system is a defined-benefit system with expenditure specified 
in cash. Benefits aimed at younger cohorts tend to be rather loosely defined in 
kind, such as the provision of schooling, family support, and labor market 
                                                 
5 Galasso, 2007   13
insertion programs, which makes them much more susceptible to dilution in the 
face of overall expenditure declines.  
 
If intergenerational fairness were to be adopted as an explicit policy aim, the 
means to achieve it would involve a clear understanding of the dynamic concept. 
The tools to achieve it include A) more gradual reform and adjustments to social 
expenditure or legislation that affects welfare distribution when a long-term trend 
requires adjustments, and B) a horizontal accounting system that analyses the 
welfare situation of specific target groups and age bands cutting across the vertical 
budget administrations and monitors check-sums of resources and effects 
obtained.  
 
SUMMARY AND FINAL COMMENTS ON HEALTH CARE AND 
SOCIAL SPENDING 
 
In most developed countries, the demographic evolution calls for bounds to the 
total amount of social expenditure -and health care in particular- that can be 
transferred from the shrinking working population to the elderly. In Southern 
European Countries, the shift from extensive informal and end-of-life care by 
relatives to a professional socialized system of care provision helps to quantify 
this total amount and to gain perspective on the underlying intergenerational 
distribution issue.  
 
However, decisions about health expenditure, such as copayment on 
pharmaceuticals, is still often considered in isolation, without an attempt to 
establish the sum total of social care expenditure on this age group, by following a 
normative principle such as the Musgrave's principle for an intergenerational 
equitable redistribution.  
 
 We have approached this principle empirically taking data from some European 
social public policies as example. We have emphasized the absence of an explicit 
trade-off between cash and service provision, e.g. the consideration of pension   14
levels in copayment decisions, between formal and informal care, eg. health and 
social health care, and ultimately between public and private individuals' 
responsibilities. This tends to expand the total budget of social expenditure 
allocated to the senior age group in detriment of social beneficiaries at other stages 
of the life cycle.  
 
To achieve a fair and efficient allocation of resources it is worth asking which 
expenditure can be considered social at each stage of the life cycle, how necessary 
it is, whether it should be socialized, and to what extent.  In answering this 
question we propose to follow the integenerational equity rule proposed by 
Musgrave's in 1984 of a fixed proportion ratio between benefits and burden of age 
cohorts, and its implications for health care. Once these bounds are established it 
is possible to make an informed judgement on the efficiency and on the 
intergenerational equity of the reallocation between cash payments and various 
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(EXTRACTED FROM BORSCH-SUPAN, THE LEVY ECONOMICS 
INSTITUTE WP-479, 2006) 
 
(EXTRACTED FROM EUROSTAT DATA ARCHIVE, 2005) 
Figure 7:  
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